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Introduction  
 
While it is a truism that the polity cannot live on bread alone, the state has 
long recognised it as a mainstay of a satisfied and therefore quiescent 
citizenry. A hungry populace is a dangerous populace. Yet feeding a nation 
is not an easy endeavour. In 2012, Zimbabwe harvested a paltry 41 000 
tonnes of its 400 000 to 450 000 tonnes of national requirement for wheat.1 
Though this was an improvement on the 2011 national output, estimated at 
23 000 tonnes, the country’s burgeoning import bill remains a cause for 
concern.2 During that period, 110 910 metric tonnes were imported from 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Russia and Australia.3  
 
Historically, discussions among the country’s agricultural 
policymakers have for the most part mainly centred on the unprofitability of 
local wheat production and the merits of concentrating on export crops such 
as tobacco and cotton in order to generate foreign exchange with which to 
purchase wheat in global markets. Answers to this widening gap between 
wheat supply and demand have been sought for more than a century but 
the lack of historical knowledge on how this historical conundrum has been 
dealt with is astounding.4 Even although various aspects of colonial 
administration in Southern Rhodesia, including land policy, the development 
of settler agriculture, politics, labour, mining, native policy and urban 
geography have received a good measure of historical attention, “bread and 
butter” issues have surprisingly escaped this attention.5 M. Rukuni et al.’s 
                                                 
*  This article is based on a paper presented at the Historical Association of South 
Africa’s Biennial Conference, University of Pretoria, 6 - 7 July 2012. The author is 
currently engaged in research on a PhD thesis on livestock disease management 
at the University of Stellenbosch.  
1.  N. Chenga, “Winter Wheat Doomed”, Financial Gazette, 22 June 2012. 
2.  “Zimbabwe: Grain and Feed Annual Report”, Draft by the USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Service, 13 January 2012, p 5. 
3.  “Zimbabwe: Grain and Feed Annual Report”, p 6.  
4.  See T.S. Jayne, M. Chisvo, M. Rukuni and P. Masanganise, “Zimbabwe’s Food 
Insecurity Paradox: Hunger amid Potential”, in M. Rukuni, P. Tawonezvi and C. 
Eicher (eds), Zimbabwean Agricultural Revolution Revisited (UZ Publications, 
Harare, 2006), pp 525–541. 
5.  See H. Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern Rhodesia, 
1890–1923 (University of Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1972); R. Palmer, Land and Racial 
Domination in Rhodesia (Heinemann, London, 1977); R. Palmer and N. Parsons 
(eds), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (London, 
Heinemann, 1977); I.R. Phimister, “Meat and Monopolies: Beef Cattle in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1890–1938”, Journal of African History, 19, 3, 1978, pp 391–414; 
V.E.M. Machingaidze, The Development of Settler Capitalist Agriculture in 
Southern Rhodesia with Particular Reference to the Role of the State: 1908–193”, 
PhD thesis, University of London, 1980; I. Phimister, An Economic History of 
Zimbabwe, 1890–1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle (Longman, 
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Zimbabwe Agricultural Revolution Revisited investigates agricultural 
concerns in the country since colonial occupation but fails to tackle the 
wheat question in its 32 chapters, and yet wheat is the colony’s second 
most important staple crop after maize.6 Where wheat is mentioned, it is in 
passing as scholars make generalised conclusions that do not take into 
account the unique dynamics of wheat production. The common narrative 
on settler agriculture is that in the 1920s, the local agricultural market was 
becoming too small to absorb local produce; that the production of each 
crop was faced with overproduction; and that during the Second World War, 
there was a change from conditions of surplus production to one of 
shortages.7 In addition, D. Dunlop generalises that there was a marked 
increase in agricultural output during the period 1945 – 1965.8   
 
This argument, although convincing at a macro level, has distinct 
weaknesses at a micro level because as will be shown in this study, there 
were no fundamental changes in the wheat position between 1928 and 
1965. Recently, presentist approaches to agrarian studies put the blame 
entirely on the country’s current predicament as an outcome of land reform 
and economic challenges facing the country since the turn of the century.9 
Concomitant to this view is the fallacy that Southern Rhodesia started 
growing wheat after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 
1965 when the illegal Ian Smith regime was hit by sanctions.10 Given this, 
this article attempts to explain how and why Southern Rhodesian efforts in 
producing wheat prior to 1965 were a failure. 
 
With a settler population consisting mainly of European-born whites 
who struggled to adopt tropical food tastes, questions about food production 
began to be asked soon after occupation and grew simultaneously with 
                                                                                                                                                    
London, 1987); S.C. Rubert, A Most Promising Weed: A History of Tobacco 
Farming and Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe 1890–1945 (Ohio Centre of 
International Studies, Athens, 1998); N. Samasuwo, “Food Production and War 
Supplies: Rhodesia’s Beef Industry during the Second World War, 1939–1945”, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 29, 2, 2003; W. Wolmer, From Wilderness 
Vision to Farm Invasions: Conservation and Development in Zimbabwe’s South 
East Lowveld (Currey, Oxford, 2007). 
6.  Rukuni, Tawonezvi and Eicher (eds), Zimbabwean Agricultural Revolution 
Revisited. 
7.  See H. Weinmann, “Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia: 1924–50,” Series in Science, No. 2, University of Rhodesia, Salisbury, 
1975. See also R. Palmer, “The Agricultural History of Rhodesia”, in Palmer and 
Parsons (eds), The Roots of Rural Poverty. 
8.  H. Dunlop, “The Development of European Agriculture in Rhodesia: 1945–1965”, 
Department of Economics, Paper 5 (University of Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1971); M. 
Rukuni, “The Evolution of Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Policy: 1890–1990”, in M. 
Rukuni and C.K. Eicher (eds), Zimbabwean Agricultural Revolution (UZ, Harare, 
1994). 
9.  See D. Moore, “Is the Land the Economy and the Economy the Land?”, Journal of 
Contemporary Studies, 19,  2, 2001, pp 253–266; B. Kingsley, “Land Reform, 
Growth and Equity: Emerging Evidence from Zimbabwe’s Resettlement 
Programme”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 25, 2, 1999, p 173–196. 
10.  O. Chifamba and E. Chikwati, “Zimbabwe: Wheat Production Declines, High Costs 
Cited”, The Herald, 2 October 2012. 
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capitalist development in the territory.11 For instance, there was a large 
inflow of mostly English-speaking immigrants from South Africa between 
1901 and 1911 from 11 000 to over 23 000.12 The cosmopolitan nature of 
the settler population meant that there were complicated interests, relations 
and alliances across the political and class divide but like their counterparts 
in other African settler colonies, they sought to reproduce certain patterns of 
Western institutions and culture.13 Despite never forming a homogenous 
whole, Southern Rhodesian settlers maintained a firm faith in their country, 
as shown by Gann who states that “white Rhodesians … stuck to their belief 
that however many setbacks their country might suffer, prosperity was 
nevertheless waiting around the corner”.14 Away from the sentimental value 
of wheat, administrators had pressing economic fundamentals of supply and 
demand to grapple with. Besides meeting local demand, the promotion of 
wheat production was linked to the desire to enter the lucrative world market 
as was the promotion of beef and tobacco industries.15 It is against this 
background that the struggle for autarky in wheat as a response to the 
growing demand for wheat and wheaten products, at first by the settler 
community and later as a result of increased urbanisation of the African 
population, will be discussed.  
  
The attitude of the settler farmers towards wheat production was at 
first non-committal. Even though wheat was part of their diet, as a cash crop 
it was unpopular and as such, was taken to be an aside crop to be farmed in 
winter when most crops such as tobacco were out of season. In supporting 
it as a winter crop, the state argued that farmers could contribute to the 
national wheat stock by using tobacco stumps as green manure, and so 
have an extra source of revenue. However, prior to 1928 efforts by the state 
to kick start wheat production were in vain. In fact, ideal conditions for wheat 
production, which existed in certain parts of the Union of South Africa, 
especially in the Cape Province, did not exist in Southern Rhodesia. Areas 
such as the Transvaal and Orange Free State, which are also subtropical, 
faced disease problems similar to those in Southern Rhodesia.16 Indeed, 
experiments carried out at Salisbury in 1917 were inconclusive. New trials 
on summer wheat carried out in 1927/28 gave good results from two 
varieties, namely Quality and Kenya Governor, which yielded 9 bags per 
                                                 
11.  European nationalities that settled in Southern Rhodesia included Britons, 
Germans, Poles, Greeks, Yugoslavians, Swedes, Swiss, Lithuanians and 
Czechoslovakians. See A.S Mlambo, “A History of Zimbabwean Migration to 
1990”, in J. Crush and D. Tevera (eds), Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, 
Survival, (SAMP, Cape Town, 2010), pp 52–76. 
12.  Mlambo, “A History of Zimbabwean Migration to 1990”, p 55. 
13.  See S.L. Morgensen, “The Bio-politics of Settler Colonialism: Right here, Right 
now”, Settler Colonial Studies, 1, 2011, pp 52–76; A. Selby, “Commercial Farmers 
and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, PhD thesis, 
University of Oxford, 2006. 
14.  L.H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934 (Chatto & Windus, 
London, 1965), p 316. 
15.  See Phimister, “Meat and Monopolies”; and Rubert, A Most Promising Weed. 
16.  Handbook for Farmers in South Africa, 3rd edition (Government Printer, Pretoria, 
1937), p 563. 
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acre on heavily manured soil.17 Since prior to that season, wheat had not 
yielded more than 5 bags per acre, these results triggered the hope that 
wheat could be produced on a large scale.18 Accordingly, a wheat breeder 
was appointed in 1928 to lead the struggle for wheat self-sufficiency. 
 
Given that until 1928 the dominating factors on the choice of crops 
were the availability of export markets and high prices, wheat production 
had not received government prioritisation. Relatively high prices existed for 
tobacco, beef and maize hence wheat, not being an export crop, was 
sidelined. Besides that, unlike wheat, tobacco research was financed mainly 
by growers, such that the diversion of funds by the Agricultural Department 
to other crops was difficult.19 Furthermore, having regard to the importance 
of tobacco both to the agricultural sector and to the economy as a whole, 
 
… it is doubtful whether a reduction in the tobacco research could have been 
justified and also the high priority placed on maize is understandable given 
the cheapness to produce it as well as the high cost of imported supplies 
during the inter-war period.20 
 
One scholar has seen this prioritisation as emanating from the 
organisation of the world capitalist system. Mvundura argues that the failure 
of the smaller agricultural industries was due to lack of “Imperial 
encouragement” except during the Second World War.21 He further states 
that since the settler economies operated within parameters designed and 
determined by British imperialism; maize, tobacco and beef production 
came to dominate. With regard to wheat the situation was different. In fact 
the major motivation for wheat production was to meet local demand. The 
colonial state did not need “Imperial encouragement” to promote its struggle 
for wheat self-sufficiency. More importantly, the dominating factors were 
availability of markets and high prices rather than “Imperial encouragement”.  
 
By 1928, the wheat import bill had become very acute hence the 
realisation that if nothing was done a crisis was inevitable. The hitherto 
unheard voices of bureaucrats grappling with the troublesome wheat import 
bill had a favourable response from the colonial state as tobacco suffered 
from economic depression on the international market. That wheat could be 
produced in winter when most crops were out of season was an added 
advantage because it would not interfere with other agricultural activities. 
The colony’s balance of wheat trade over a three year period (1927–1930) 
as shown in Figure 1 below, reveals Southern Rhodesia’s dependence on 
wheat imports.  
 
 
                                                 
17.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 56. 
18.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 56. 
19.  Machingaidze, “The Development of Settler Capitalist Agriculture”. 
20.  Dunlop, The Development of European Agriculture, p 28. 
21.  A. Mvundura, “Sheep Farming in Zimbabwe: 1905–85”, BA Economic History 
dissertation, University of Zimbabwe, 1987, p 5. 
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Figure 1: Wheat production and consumption22  
  
Furthermore, the state’s campaign for wheat self-sufficiency fitted 
very well into the euphoria of the time, occurring as it did just after the 
attainment of responsible government status in 1923. In the interest of the 
state, reliance on outside sources for wheat and wheaten products was not 
revered as it was a stain on the conceptualisation of modernity and 
greatness espoused by the state.23 Southern Rhodesia’s decision to turn to 
wheat self-sufficiency was not without regional precedence as South Africa 
was during this time also pursuing a similar policy.24 
 
However, such an ambitious project could not take off as long as 
economic conditions were unfavourable. It was not until the crash of the 
tobacco industry as a result of the onset of the Great Depression in the 
1927–28 season that the views of the bureaucrats for the first time coincided 
with those of the farmers who were anxious to recoup their losses by 
venturing into any protected industry such as the wheat industry. The 
marketing problems existing in the agricultural sector at large and tobacco 
industry in particular provided a perfect setting for launching this ambitious 
programme. Once the viability of the tobacco industry became doubtful, the 
government quickly turned to other crops including wheat. It was in this spirit 
that in 1929 the Hillside Experimental Station, which had been opened in 
1924 for tobacco research, shifted its focus to wheat and other crops.25 The 
impact of this new initiative was instantaneous, albeit short-lived, because it 
                                                 
22.  National Archives Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ), S1265/C2/1, Wheat Conference, 
1931. 
23.  See T. Mafukidze, “Towards inevitable conflict: an examination of the political 
effect of the 1923 award of internal self-government to the colony of Southern 
Rhodesia”, M.A. Thesis, Duquesne University, 1973. 
24.  J.M. Tinley, South African Food and Agriculture in World War 2 (Stanford 
University Press, California, 1954), p 50. 
25.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 56. 
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22.  National Archives Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ), S1265/C2/1, Wheat Conference, 
1931. 
23.  See T. Mafukidze, “Towards inevitable conflict: an examination of the political 
effect of the 1923 award of internal self-government to the colony of Southern 
Rhodesia”, M.A. Thesis, Duquesne University, 1973. 
24.  J.M. Tinley, South African Food and Agriculture in World War 2 (Stanford 
University Press, California, 1954), p 50. 
25.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 56. 
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22.  National Archives Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ), S1265/C2/1, Wheat Conference, 
1931. 
23.  See T. Mafukidze, “Towards inevitable conflict: an examination of the political 
effect of the 1923 award of internal self-government to the colony of Southern 
Rhodesia”, M.A. Thesis, Duquesne University, 1973. 
24.  J.M. Tinley, South African Food and Agriculture in World War 2 (Stanford 
University Press, California, 1954), p 50. 
25.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 56. 
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ignited the hope that the crop could indeed be produced commercially. As 
tobacco farmers fled from the scourge of depressed markets, there was a 
simultaneous fall in the percentage share of tobacco on Southern 
Rhodesian exports: while tobacco exports of the years 1926, 1927 and 1928 
were valued at 26.5; 46.4; and 42.7 percent of the value of all agricultural 
exports, they represented only 17 and 17.4 percent in 1929 and 1930 
respectively.26  
 
Most promising years, 1928–1939  
 
The decision to promote wheat coincided with changes in land ownership 
and control dynamics because of the passage of the Land Apportionment 
Act (1930). This Act resulted in the shift of all prime lands into settler hands 
and in the process fundamentally changed, albeit temporarily, wheat 
prospects.27 Approximately 60 000 Africans were moved off European land 
during the 1930s.28 Besides availing settler farmers with rich lands, the 
government introduced measures meant to avoid the marketing problems in 
the wheat industry. Indeed, the collapse of the tobacco industry had aptly 
demonstrated that any local industry needed to be shielded from external 
pressures. It was, therefore, not surprising that the wheat industry was 
protected from falling prices by a pricing agreement entered into between 
the government and wheat traders in early 1928, stipulating that the wheat 
traders should pay a fixed price of 28s per bushel until 1931.29 The impact 
of these interventions did not take long to manifest. By 1933, wheat 
production had risen considerably, resulting in a temporary change in the 
proportion of local wheat in flour from one in every four to one in every two 
of imported wheat.30  
 
With these promising developments, the settler state offered every 
encouragement and assistance to farmers to expand wheat production. To 
mount and sustain this struggle for increased wheat production required the 
full-time services of a wheat breeder. Accordingly, from 1934, when tobacco 
research was shifted to Trelawney, wheat breeding and selection for the first 
time in the colony’s history continued at Hillside under the supervision of a 
qualified wheat breeder, T.K Sansom.31 Research and the development of 
high yielding variables suitable for local conditions continued and under the 
leadership of Sansom, progress was also made in determining ways and 
means of overcoming problems such as weeds, especially in respect of 
summer wheat. 
 
However, it also became apparent very early that the government’s 
task would not be achieved without sponsoring enthusiastic, prospective 
                                                 
26.  Machingaidze, “The Development of Settler Capitalist Agriculture, p 183. 
27.  Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p 223. 
28.  Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p 223. 
29.  NAZ, S482/781/1939/1, Maize, Wheat, Grain: 1923–1941, Confidential Minute of 
the Imperial Economic Commission on Wheat, 20 April 1931. 
30.  NAZ, S482/781/1939/1, Maize, Wheat, Grain: 1923–1941, Minutes of a meeting of 
the Buyers, Wheat Growers and Government, 10 November 1933.  
31.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 10. 
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wheat farmers. The arousing of public conscience during the depression 
was not difficult because the provision of funds made it attractive to some 
bankrupt ex-tobacco farmers. Wheat farmers, like tobacco, maize and beef 
farmers, benefited from government financial support in the form of loans. 
These loans were secured with easy terms, usually the next year’s crop.32 
On a broader perspective, the state availed agricultural finance from the 
Land Bank to the tune of over ₤1million in 1934 and there was a three year 
moratorium on all instalments for farms.33 From 1935–36, a 50 percent 
subsidy was introduced and technical support was launched to allow settler 
farmers to build soil and undertake conservation work. As a result of this 
assistance, 5 022 new dams had been built on white-owned farms by 
1950.34  
 
One challenge which both the government and wheat farmers faced 
was that the farmers were scattered throughout the country and so were 
producing wheat under different agro-ecological conditions. The major 
wheat growing areas were the Charter, Chilimanzi, Melsetter, Hartley, 
Umtali and Mazoe districts. This meant that the development of a wheat 
variety suitable for the entire country was difficult. However, the fact that the 
state took wheat production seriously can be demonstrated by its 
preparedness to work with individual farmers in any part of the country who 
showed interest in this crop. This is appropriately illustrated by its 1931 
agreement with an Enkeldoorn farmer, C.W. Lamprecht, under which the 
latter was supplied with all seeds and fertilisers for the production of vlei35 
wheat. The results were disappointing, partly because of the poor rainfall 
recorded in the 1930–31 rain season which left insufficient moisture in the 
soil; and the tremendous heat during the month of May dried the soil too 
quickly.36 Therefore, this experiment did not provide conclusive results on 
the production of vlei wheat across the territory. Information arising out of 
experiments at Lamprecht's farm was only helpful to other farmers in his 
district but not to those in regions whose agro-ecological conditions were 
different.  
 
There were also some farmers who mandated themselves to produce 
wheat for local consumption and genuinely believed in the idea of self-
sufficiency in wheat. Reuben Rademeyer was a classic example of the 
colony’s enthusiastic wheat farmers. He carried out experiments at his farm 
in the Melsetter District which demonstrated that wheat could be grown on 
land where there was prevailing mist from between six weeks to two months 
of the wheat growing period.37 His findings came as a surprise to the 
                                                 
32.  Rubert, A Most Promising Weed, p 23–24. 
33.  Rubert, A Most Promising weed, p 23–24. 
34.  Rubert, A Most Promising weed, p 23–24. 
35.  Vleis are moisture retaining soils (wetlands). Similar experiments were also carried 
out at Raubenheimer’s farm in 1934. Like the 1931 experiments the Raubenheimer 
experiments were to a greater extent a failure. 
36.  NAZ, S1215/1225/3, Winter Cereal Demonstration, Letter from a farmer, 
Lamprecht - D.M. MacLaughlin, 9 October 1931. 
37.  NAZ, S482/781/1939/1, Maize, Wheat and Grain: 1923–1941, Letter from 
Rademeyer - the Prime Minister, 30 March 1931. 
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agricultural scientists, such that his letter was circulated from one 
department to another in search of ideas. However, agricultural experts, 
particularly the head of the Division of Plant Industry, dismissed 
Rademeyer’s findings, arguing that in most cases this form of wheat culture 
had failed. Nonetheless, they concluded that the type of soil, variety and 
date of sowing were reasons for success at Rademeyer’s farm.38 
Unfortunately, the available archival material does not reveal whether this 
farmer continued producing wheat under persistently “cloudy” conditions.  
 
Having found Rademeyer’s findings impracticable across the country, 
the state diverted its attention to irrigated wheat.39 The results were very 
encouraging. For instance in 1932, wheat acreage topped 14 172 acres, a 
rise from 8 669 acres in 1931, while the most notable feature was the 
increase of irrigated land resulting in the rise in average output per acre 
from 2.3 bags in 1931 to 3 bags in 1932.40 As the number of wheat farmers 
increased, certain areas began to lay claim to the title of wheat regions. 
Charter District became the principal wheat growing centre with 4 864 acres 
of which 4 110 acres were under wet vleis and 754 under irrigation, followed 
by Melsetter with 1 625 acres of which 1 327 were irrigated.41  
 
All these developments translated into increased wheat output relative 
to the pre-1928 period. There had been 212 settler wheat farmers on 3 272 
acres with an output of 7 000 bags in 1928; but in 1939 this had risen to 531 
growers on 22 000 acres, with an output of 58 000 bags.42 With such a 
promising picture, the agriculture officials were quick to forecast that wheat 
self-sufficiency would be achieved by the early 1940s.The increase in the 
number of wheat farmers was seen as an indicator that a viable wheat 
industry could be established. This increase was accompanied by a rapid 
expansion of the acreage given to wheat as well as output, especially in 
1933, 1936 and 1939. Nonetheless, the country’s needs continued to 
outstrip local production, partly because except for a few who produced 
about 12.5 bags per acre, the national average was pegged at 2.55 bags.43  
 
However, the rise in the number of wheat farmers was not necessarily 
accompanied by increased output per acre. With all this investment and 
milestones reached, in comparative terms, wheat remained an ‘‘aside” crop 
because it did not come anywhere near the major crops (tobacco and 
maize) in terms of overall national output. When the positive developments 
of the 1930s are juxtaposed with consumption patterns, the reality is that 
                                                 
38.  NAZ, S482/781/1939/1, Maize, Wheat and Grain: 1923–1941, Letter from Chief of 
Division of Plant Industry - Prime Minister, 14 April 1931. 
39.  See G. Turck, “Wheat Irrigation and Economics”, Modern Farming, October 1963. 
40.  NAZ, S1216/SC64/122/6, Wheat Bushel Weights, 1933, Minutes of the 
Conference held on 8 February 1933 between Rhodesia Wheat Growers’ 
Association (hereafter RWGA), Millers and the Government. 
41.  NAZ, S1216/SC64/122/6, Wheat Bushel Weights, 1933, Minutes of the 
Conference, 8 February 1933.  
42.  D.E. McLaughlin, “Wheat Production in Southern Rhodesia,” Rhodesian 
Agricultural Journal, 113, 1939, p 1. 
43.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 56.   
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these did not tilt the balance in favour of the settler government. 
Undoubtedly, the government’s principal achievement during the late 1920s 
and 1930s was its creation of an awareness of the need for the wheat 
industry to produce more in the national interest. This resulted in the 
genuine growth of the farmers’ desire to increase wheat production. 
 
War and wheat production, 1939–1945 
 
By 1939, the state appeared to have established a solid foundation for the 
production of wheat under tropical conditions. However, a myriad of 
challenges emanating from the war threatened to derail the pre-war gains, 
and the overall goal of wheat self-sufficiency. During the Second World War, 
Southern Rhodesia was used as a training ground for the Royal Air Force, 
and as a refugee camp for war internees comprising mainly Italian prisoners 
of war. In particular, the early months of the war saw the influx of 
approximately 15 000 Royal Air Training personnel.44 In addition, there was 
a rise in the urban African labour force which, among other things, further 
increased domestic wheat consumption. All these issues and other related 
challenges resulted in the reduction of wheat acreage from over 20 000 
acres in 1939, to 12 600 acres in 1946.45 Failure to improve production 
coupled with shipping difficulties compromised the quality of wheat and 
wheaten products in Southern Rhodesia. Large numbers of consumers 
found it difficult to secure sufficient quality bread. As a result, there was a 
flood of complaints sent to the bakers over the wartime bread. The following 
letter sent to the Osborne Bakery (Pvt. Ltd) illustrates this: 
  
With the war time bread you have to eat it on the same day as it goes bad 
easily. On the second day, you cannot even make pudding with it. The 
monthly account for two people has increased by 2/6 as much on account of 
waste. Why must we eat bread like this and send our flour to Northern 
Rhodesia. Do we owe it to them? Bread is the staff of life where school 
children come in. Something must be done on the matter. Will eating this 
bread help to win the war?46 
 
Most affected by the war were the research activities of the 
Agriculture Department which as shown in the previous section, had been 
responsible for increased wheat production in the 1930s. The department 
lost valuable personnel to the war effort resulting in only 30–40 percent of its 
260 officers being on active service.47 In turn, this affected administrative 
and technical assistance to wheat farmers. Furthermore, the war coincided 
with unstable rainfall patterns. The seasons after the 1942 drought were 
                                                 
44.  See N.W. Samasuwo, ‘“There is Something Special about Cattle’: Towards an 
Economic History of the Beef Industry in Colonial Zimbabwe with Special 
Reference to the Role of the State, 1939 to 1980”, PhD thesis, UCT, 2000, p 54; R. 
Blake, A History of Rhodesia (Eyre & Methuen, London, 1977). 
45.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 57. 
46.  NAZ, S3574/1/158, Subsidy on Wheat, Correspondence and Memoranda, 1937–
43, Letter from an anonymous customer - Osborn Bakery, undated. 
47.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, 1924–50, p 3. 
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characterised by insufficient rainfall, hence wheat acreage declined from 
over 20 000 acres in 1939 to 12 600 in 1946.48  
 
During this time, wheat production was severely affected by seed 
wheat shortages. The case of one Umtali wheat farmer, C. Pellate, vividly 
illustrates how serious these challenges were. Writing to the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Pellate reported his failure to find any seed wheat of whatever 
quality in Umtali and indicated that the prices quoted by Salisbury 
merchants were prohibitive.49 Following this letter, McLaughlin, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, wrote to the Rhodesia Wheat Growers’ Association 
(RWGA) on the need for the formation of a seed wheat association, and 
lamented that, “as usual no reliable seed will be obtainable at planting time 
and the chances are that the farmers will be buying their commercial wheat 
at a higher price than 22/6d per bag for seed purposes.”50 To Pellate, he did 
not have any good answer for he wrote: “At present there is a shortage of 
seed wheat … I do not know of any growers having seed wheat for sale 
except Mr Morkel of Shamva.”51 The response received from the RWGA 
was that none of its members had seed wheat.52 The fact that the farmers 
had to obtain seeds from distant places increased their operating costs and 
for the less capitalised, the solution was to use grain from previous yields. 
 
Even though labour had always been a problem affecting agriculture 
and mining in the colony, this worsened during the war which witnessed the 
development of a manufacturing industry.53 Given that wheat production 
amounted to a series of labour intensive activities (ploughing, weeding, 
green manuring, harvesting and threshing), it is imperative to show how 
shortages affected the industry. Indeed, wartime experiences by settler 
wheat farmers were not homogenous because labour shortages came 
relatively earlier in some districts. For example, in response to a request by 
the RWGA in 1941, the Native Commissioner (hereafter NC) for Umvuma 
wrote: 
 
In Chilimanzi District a large number of natives are busy reaping and 
threshing their own wheat … it is estimated that about 500 local natives are 
employed on the Air Force grounds in Gwelo District as well as 230 local 
natives on the Italian refugee camp construction at Umvuma. This work is 
taking longer than I was made to believe in the first place and necessitated 
an “indaba” yesterday afternoon to persuade the large number who asked to 
be signed off to remain at work there for a couple of months longer by which 
time it is hoped that work would be completed. A number of Road 
                                                 
48.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, 1924–50, p 3. 
49.  NAZ, S1215/1220/9, Seed Wheat Growers Association, Letter from C. Pellate 
(Umtali wheat grower) - Secretary of Agriculture, 6 April 1939.   
50.  NAZ, S1215/1220/9, Seed Wheat Growers Association, Secretary of Agriculture - 
RWGA, 9 April 1939. 
51.  NAZ, S1215/1220/9, Seed Wheat Growers Association, Secretary of Agriculture - 
Pellate, 9 April 1939. 
52.  NAZ, S1215/1220/9, Seed Wheat Growers Association, Letter from RWGA - 
Secretary of Agriculture, 8 April 1939. 
53.  See A.S. Mlambo, “From the Second World War to UDI, 1940–1965”, in B. 
Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-
colonial Period to 2008 (Weaver Press, Harare, 2009). 
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Department natives who were helping at the camp are now being taken back 
to the Roads.54 
 
Contrary to this, the NC Gutu reported that wheat growers in Beatrice, 
Chatsworth and Enkeldoorn were turning back applicants for work. In 
Enkeldoorn, G.R. Zambara, of Kanameekgate farm, wrote to the NC: “I have 
to acknowledge the receipt of your letter for which I have to thank you, but I 
am yes (sic) fenish (sic) with my cutting. So I need no more boys (sic) I will 
rember (sic) this nex (sic) year.”55 The NC Enkeldoorn wrote: 
 
There has not been a shortage of labour [wheat] for that purpose [reaping] 
here. In this and Chilimanzi District large numbers of women and girls turn 
out at reaping and help with the wheat crop. It has been our experience in 
the past that the only people who experience difficulty in obtaining natives for 
reaping are those who have been unfair to natives for reaping in the past 
years. Many native men, to whom regular work does not appeal, turn out to 
assist during wheat harvesting as the work period is short and wages good.56 
 
Wheat farmers who used female labour killed two birds with one 
stone. In addition to offsetting the apparent shortages of male labour, female 
labour was cheaper. The price controller acknowledged this fact when he 
reported that, “the low cost during the war years were probably due to the 
replacement of male staff by female staff wherever possible”.57  
 
In areas facing labour shortages, the state intervened in order to 
ensure wheat production. As already noted, most wheat farmers were 
people who were still trying to establish themselves following their harsh 
experiences during the Depression, many were small producers who could 
not afford mechanised agriculture. Very few wheat growers owned combine 
harvesters and threshers. For instance, the only threshing machine 
available in Enkeldoorn District belonged to a Mr Brits, who had not finished 
paying instalments for its purchase and, thus, risked losing it to debt 
collectors.58 Brits could not increase charges for his services in order to 
clear his debt without facing the wrath of the law because this was at a time 
when the government controlled all prices for agricultural crops and 
services. This situation cast a shadow of doubt on the wheat farmers, who in 
the spirit of war effort, had increased their acreage but with no thresher, they 
faced an uncertain future.59 What saved Brits was the importance of his 
thresher in a district where no other wheat farmer possessed one, and that 
                                                 
54.  NAZ, S482/789/39/2, Maize, Wheat and Grain: 1923–41, Letter from the Native 
Commissioner (hereafter NC) Umvuma - Secretary of Native Affairs, 10 October 
1941. 
55.  NAZ, S482/789/39/2, Maize, Wheat and Grain: 1923–41, Letter from G.R. 
Zambara to NC Gutu, 13 October 1941. 
56.  NAZ, S482/789/39/2, Maize, Wheat and Grain: 1923–41, Letter from NC 
Enkeldoorn to the Chief Native Commissioner (hereafter CNC), 16 October 1941. 
57.  NAZ, S87/3, Wheat and Flour, Letter from Price Controller - Secretary of the Food 
Production Committee (hereafter FPC), 13 January 1954. 
58.  NAZ, S482/789/39/2, Maize, Wheat and Grain: 1923–41, Letter from NC 
Enkeldoorn - CNC, 16 October 1941. 
59.  NAZ, S955/293/1/2, Wheat Subsidies and Prices: 1943–46, Letter from M.F. Brits - 
Secretary of FPC, 10 December 1942. 
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the country could ill afford to lose the little it produced. The government, 
under a special clause, allowed him to increase his charges. Elsewhere, 
whereas in 1941, Gutu District had not complained of labour shortages, by 
1943 the situation was precarious. The secretary of the Gutu Farmers 
Association wrote, “In reply to a broadcast by one member of my 
Association for forty wheat cutters just over a month ago, he has had only 
one applicant for a job”.60 The problem was acute such that some farmers 
suggested the use of recruits and African constables released from the Foot 
and Mouth cordons. Acknowledging that the NCs had tried to save the 
situation from further deterioration, the Association went on to say that 
Cripwell (NC Gutu), “has done all he can do to get those labourers by 
blandishment and guile but he failed. On grounds of national interests 
something must be done”.61  
 
The war brought another dynamic that impacted negatively on the 
goal of wheat self-sufficiency. Due to the demand for professionals to serve 
in Allied armies, shortages of skilled and semi-skilled European and African 
wheat labour became rampant. Many settler white men served in the 
Imperial Army and this left the older generation on the farms short staffed. In 
fact, most males left behind were “urban dwellers who had failed medical 
tests for army duty and these rarely turned into skilled farmers”.62 This 
placed the intended goal of wheat self-sufficiency behind schedule. With 
regard to the threshing of the 1943 crop, the RWGA had to make what at 
that time had become a “normal” request when they wrote to the Food 
Production Committee (FPC) seeking the release of one R.J.P. van der 
Bergh of Enkeldoorn, who was serving in the Renaissance Unit (an Allied 
battalion based at Umtali).63 Van der Bergh owned a thresher and a tractor 
which in his absence had no operator. As a result, the man had to balance 
two careers, one in the army and the other in the wheat industry.  
 
The hope that could not fade: wheat production, 1945–1965 
 
The population explosion in the post-war period made sure that the wheat 
position remained poor but this did not snuff out the envisaged wheat self-
sufficiency. The state’s unflinching position on wheat reached its peak with 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. One would have 
expected the state to change its policy in the face of overwhelming odds but 
the opposite happened. The vast economic opportunities provided by the 
country’s booming economy in the immediate post-war period as well as the 
formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 attracted 
thousands of immigrants and ex-servicemen from war-ravaged Europe and 
the British Commonwealth. Of the Federation’s 40 percent increase in non-
                                                 
60.  NAZ, S955/293/1/2, Wheat Subsidies and Prices: 1943–46, Letter from Secretary, 
Gutu Farmers Association - Secretary FPC, 5 September 1943. 
61.  NAZ, S955/293/1/2, Wheat Subsidies and Prices: 1943–46, Letter from Secretary, 
Gutu Farmers Association - Secretary of FPC, 5 September 1943. 
62.  R. Hodder-Williams, White Farmers in Rhodesia: a history of the Marandellas 
District, (Macmillan, California, 1983), p 158. 
63.  NAZ, S955/293/1/2, Wheat Subsidies and Prices: 1943–46, Letter from Secretary 
of the RWGA - Secretary of FPC, 10 October 1943. 
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African population from 196 897 to 277 240 between 1951 and 1956, 54 
percent were in Southern Rhodesia; 38,5 percent in Northern Rhodesia; and 
the remaining 7,5 percent in Nyasaland.64 Most of the immigrants took up 
employment in mining, agriculture and manufacturing. These new arrivals 
peaked 17 000 in 1948 alone,65 and in the process more than doubled the 
white population in Southern Rhodesia from 82 386 in 1946 to 177 124 in 
1956.66 By 1962, the white population topped 223 000 besides 11 000 
coloured people and 7 600 Asians.67 Furthermore, the number of Africans in 
wage employment rose from 254 000 in 1936 to more than 600 000 in 
1956.68 All these developments meant a further increase in the demand for 
wheat and wheaten products. Post-war population explosion and demand 
for wheat and wheaten products was not peculiar to Southern Rhodesia. For 
instance, in 1946 alone, wheat consumption in South Africa, particularly in 
the Cape and Witwatersrand, increased by 10 and 40 percent 
respectively.69 
 
In Southern Rhodesia, the calamity can be appreciated if one 
considers that this population explosion occurred at a time when the wheat 
position was deteriorating. Before 1945, the largest yields, ranging from 52 
000 to 58 000 bags, were in 1936, 1939, 1943 and 1944.70 However, after 
1946, total yields declined, reaching their lowest in 1950 with 3 405 bags.71 
This decline was mainly caused by the 1947/8 drought which resulted in the 
loss of moisture needed for the production of vlei wheat as well as the 
drying up of the streams used for irrigation. With such a discouraging return 
from its investment (in the form of subsidies, bonuses, loans, import quotas 
and the provision of new wheat varieties), the state accused wheat farmers 
of failing to complement its efforts in increasing production. This accusation 
was not new but grew even louder with the steep rise in the demand for 
wheat and wheaten products.  
 
Among the major impediments to Rhodesia’s goal during this time, 
the state argued, was the use of “inefficient” methods of wheat production. 
In as much as the farmers shared the state’s goal, most were small scale 
producers. Only a few large farmers produced wheat profitably on irrigated 
land while the majority farmed in vlei areas with very low production rates 
per acre.72 Vlei had in the 1930s constituted a significant percentage of 
wheat produced locally but had diminished nutritionally in the 1940s and 
                                                 
64.  C. Baker, “The Non-African Population of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland”, Geography, 43, 2, 1958, p 133. 
65.  Samasuwo, “There is Something Special about Cattle”, p 80. 
66.  Samasuwo, “There is Something Special about Cattle”, p 80. 
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(Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1964), p 35. 
68.  Samasuwo, “There is Something Special about Cattle”, p 80. 
69.  Tinley, South African Food and Agriculture, p 107. 
70.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 57. 
71.  Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development, p 57. 
72.  Yields of vlei wheat averaged 1,8 bags per acre in 1932/3; 2,4 bags in 1943/4; and 
declined to 1,4 bags between 1948 and 1950. See Weinmann, Agricultural 
Research and Development, p 56.  
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1950s. For financial reasons, vlei wheat farmers neither applied fertilisers 
nor manure so output per acre declined over time. However, this was just 
part of the bigger problem facing the wheat industry.  
 
The major issue was the fact that state crop scientists failed to 
produce a wheat variety suitable for the territory’s agro-ecological zones. 
Recommended varieties were no better than harvested grain so complaints 
from farmers ignoring the advice of the agricultural officials were rampant. In 
1948, the chief agriculturist reported: “A few of the leading wheat growers 
have followed the advice but the greater majority are content  to hear of the 
good crops reaped by more ‘fortunate’ farmers and regard those superior 
results as an act of God.”73 This statement explains what was happening in 
the wheat industry but the reasons provided are open to criticism. The claim 
that farmers were impervious to scientific advice was problematic. A number 
of reasons, other than those provided by the state accounted for the poor 
production figures. Firstly, the seasons starting from 1947 were not 
particularly good from a farming point of view. In the 1947/8 season, then 
considered the worst in the country’s colonial history, wheat farmers failed to 
green manure or apply fertiliser.74 In many areas, green manure used for 
winter wheat production was reaped for hay in order to assist in maintaining 
livestock.75 The drying up of several moisture retaining areas, and also the 
failure on the part of several large wheat growers to plant wheat further 
reversed the pre-1939 successes (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 1946–1947 wheat season76 
 
The drought’s effects were widespread as seed-wheat growers could 
not produce seed, and those who were fortunate could not sell. The state 
baled them out by placing seed-wheat under the Drought Relief Measures. 
                                                 
73.  Cited by A. Masenda, “The Food Production Committee and State Food Policy in 
Colonial Zimbabwe during the 1940s”, MA dissertation, UZ, 1987, p 22. 
74.  NAZ, S2535/1040/9/6, Chief Agriculturist, Report for 1947. 
75.  NAZ, S2535/1040/9/6, Chief Agriculturist, Report for 1947. 
76.  NAZ, S2535/1040/9/6, Chief Agriculturist, Report for 1947. 
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Under this scheme, farmers received 20/- per bag, that is, the difference 
between the price of commercial wheat (35/-) and certified wheat (45/-) plus 
10/- subsidy per bag.77 However, owing to lack of seed-wheat, in areas such 
as Umvuma there was widespread use of harvested grain as seed that 
season and this seed generally yielded less grain per acre. The 
centralisation of seed-dealers in two towns (Bulawayo and Gwelo) also 
meant that transport costs were high for farmers outside these areas.78  
 
However, for all its effort, the state did little to market seed-wheat 
through outreach programmes. Where recommended seeds were used, 
these could not germinate and a number of complaints were received from 
farmers. Letters from farmers, C.C Kloppers and W. Shaw of Kanya and 
Floradale farms respectively, are informative on this issue. Shaw reported: 
 
I wish to draw your attention to the poor germination I had from a bag of 
Punjab [wheat variety] I bought through the agents of the seed-wheat 
growers … the purity is stated as 87 percent but it’s sad to say I only got a 7 
per cent stand.79  
 
Kloppers complained,  
 
[The] seed wheat I bought two months ago has been a complete washout, 
the wheat has not come up and I would like to put in a claim. It cost me a lot 
of money, my expenditure was over ₤75 for seed fertiliser, lime, plough 
shares and boys’ [sic] wages. I have got one bag left that I did not put in; you 
can have it with the greatest of pleasure and try to make it grow if you can. 
My lands here are awaiting your inspection. 80 
 
These setbacks, notwithstanding, the state maintained its stance on 
local production. By blaming most of the setbacks on natural phenomena, 
government officials sustained their ambitions by optimistically stating that 
the following season was going to bring far better results. For instance, the 
chairperson of the FPC stated:  
 
I see no reason why we should not be producing all our foodstuffs ... given a 
sympathetic government, a government with good vision, and good farming 
carried out … this country is quite capable of producing all its requirements.81  
 
This was cheap propaganda. A variety of factors determined the possibility 
for wheat production in the colony. The chairperson ignored climatic and 
financial issues such as the unavailability of water resources and the 
inability (largely financial) of the wheat farmers to take advantage of some 
                                                 
77.  NAZ, S2506/2, Poor Germination of Certified Wheat Seed, Letter from A.E. 
Romyn, Secretary of  Department of Agriculture - Chief Agriculturist,19 May 1947. 
78.  The major wheat growing areas were Charter, Chilimanzi, Melsetter, Hartley, 
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81.  NAZ, S955/100, Agricultural Development in Southern Rhodesia, Memoranda: 
1943–1949, Report by the FPC, “Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia (1948)”. 
206
Peer-reviewed conference paper – Settler wheat production 
 
206 
 
available water bodies, which partly explain the inability to improve irrigated 
wheat production. 
 
These difficulties forced the state to take measures designed to plug 
challenges facing the industry and, it was hoped, salvage success from the 
jaws of defeat. In the wake of the germination problems, a professional 
officer charged with duties of testing agricultural seeds was appointed in 
1948. The passing of the Seed Regulation Act (1953) was a welcome move 
as it marked a rapid increase in the volume of seed samples received for 
testing. However, maize was the only seed-crop being produced under 
certification. For wheat, officials provided recommended seeds. Due to their 
unreliability, producers deliberately avoided the use of the word certified. 
This was an indirect acknowledgement that locally produced wheat was 
unreliable.  
 
However, efforts to create a seed industry run on professional lines to 
save the situation from further deterioration proved inadequate. Until 1953 
seed-wheat was sold indiscriminately and important issues, such as 
packaging were not taken into consideration. The norm was, as H.W. 
Bosman noted that: 
 
At the Midlands Farmers’ Co-op, a farmer merely brings in a few bags of 
seed and it is sold as such. More often, bags of seed are stored in a 
warehouse where different varieties are stocked together. Should a farmer 
ask for a particular variety he is likely to be sold some other variety as the 
bags are not labelled. No one employed in the Co-op is qualified to 
distinguish between different varieties.82 
 
The above situation typifies the confusion that existed in the seed 
industry and partly accounts for the farmers’ negative response to 
recommended seeds. 
 
In the post-war period, labour problems, which had become acute 
during the war, escalated further. The story of R.H. Brooke of Milward Farm 
is illustrative. Brooke wrote: 
 
I am already a receiver of five farm labourers, one a cripple leaving four fit for 
work. I now apply for 30 boys for your earliest possible delivery date for food 
production only … so far I have only received four boys from you and would 
certainly look forward to considerably more than this if I am expected to grow 
... All recruiting being stopped has deprived me of obtaining labour from 
those sources so I now depend on you for my requirements. If you are 
unable to quote a figure I would be greatly relieved and then make 
arrangements for my inevitable closedown.83 
 
In these difficult circumstances, the state through the FPC 
encouraged farmers to allow African males to reside on the farms with their 
families as a permanent labour force; the use of women and children as 
                                                 
82.  NAZ, S2518/2, Seed Testing Legislation: 1951–7, Letter from H.W. Bosman 
(Extension Officer, Gwelo) to Senior Extension Officer, Gwelo, 13 March 1953. 
83.  NAZ, S955/170, Labour, General, 1949, Letter from R.H. Brooke to the Rhodesia 
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labourers; and improving living conditions and higher wages.84 However, 
this intervention fell short of solving the pertinent handicap in the industry. In 
fact: 
 
To say that the problem is one of labour shortage is oversimplifying it for 
quality is probably even more important than quantity. In England, there are 
farms of [up to] 1 300 acres with a labour force of 15 to 18 adults. It is true 
that mechanisation has gone further there and that fuel shortages in 
Rhodesia hamper the replacement of men with machinery but that is not the 
whole answer. In England where agricultural workers receive a higher wage 
than they do here, they earn their pay. The same cannot be said of our own 
farm boys (sic). Some farmers require a good day’s work while others are 
satisfied with very much less. There is thus a tendency for labour to flow to 
“easier” employers who are not always the best farmers and biggest 
contributors to the country’s food supplies.85 
 
The 1950s saw emphasis being placed on raising wages for 
agricultural labourers. The state and the Rhodesia National Farmers’ Union 
generally believed that if wheat farmers paid competitive wages, they could 
attract recruits from other territories; reduce the labour drift to South Africa; 
and enable agriculture to compete for labour with the manufacturing 
industry.86 However, this suggestion had its problems because of the 
diversity of wheat growers, and the fact that farmers in some areas paid 
higher wages. Furthermore, fixing different minimum wages for different 
areas would have resulted in the flow of labour from one area to another 
where they were better paid. Proponents of labour rationing suggested 
controls in industry and agriculture; grading labour according to quality and 
output; and paying a living wage for each grade. The major limitation to this 
proposal was the difficulty in assessing labour requirements in view of the 
varying conditions under which the wheat farmers were operating. More 
importantly, there was no guarantee that labourers who moved from an 
“inefficient” wheat farmer, would go to one who insisted on a “fair” day’s 
work rather than seek his fortune in South Africa or the manufacturing 
industry.87 These attempts to lure Africans to work in wage employment 
were bound to fail because they came at a time when there was heightened 
worker consciousness. Workers wanted better working and living conditions, 
better wages, housing, social services and fairer colonial governance.88 
Labour problems in Southern Rhodesia in general and the wheat industry in 
particular continued throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. 
 
From the early 1950s when labour shortages, notwithstanding state 
efforts, became particularly acute for wheat producers, the government 
shifted its commitment from winter to summer wheat production. This 
change was largely attributable to H.C. Mundy, a former Secretary of 
Agriculture and farmer, who advised: 
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Southern Rhodesia’s annual consumption of wheat is reported to have risen 
to about 400 000 bags, local production is almost negligible. Our European 
demand for wheat production is constantly expanding … I understand that 
the government is pinning its hopes for larger wheat production on the Sabi 
Irrigation Scheme but from my past experience with wheat at what is now 
Vandenberg Estate I fear it will be found that wheat will grow so rapidly as to 
give very low yields. The Department should concentrate on a policy of 
wheat breeding in order to develop strains sufficiently rust resistant to be 
grown in summer in Mashonaland …89 
 
In his response to Mundy, Sansom discouraged the suggested shift to 
summer wheat, arguing that it was affected by weeds no matter how clean 
the land was when the wheat was sown and that its quality was lower than 
that of winter wheat by an average of 3lbs.90 He also noted that at Matopos 
Experimental Station, where wheat breeding was underway, there was only 
a limited amount of field work done due to lack of facilities; that conditions 
were not typical of any wheat growing areas; and there was a shortage of 
staff.91  
 
This debate was followed closely in government circles. Being an 
influential person and perhaps by virtue of having previously carried a higher 
office than that of Sansom, the only experienced wheat breeder in the 
country at that time, Mundy’s ideas were popular because they tallied with 
the overall goal of self-sufficiency. Correspondence was exchanged 
between Sansom and Mundy each propounding his view. What this 
correspondence reveals is that, in their desperation for wheat self-
sufficiency, the officials in the Agriculture Department and farmers who 
shared the view that wheat could be grown in summer, were prepared to 
ignore expert advice. Using a figure (shown below, Figure 3), Mundy 
estimated the imbalance between production and requirements on which he 
based his argument for summer wheat production. Whereas Sansom 
considered the country’s agro-ecological conditions, Mundy based his 
opinion largely on the country’s rising wheat needs and his conviction that 
the country could provide for itself. Mundy triumphed in the first leg of the 
debate but the subsequent failures in summer wheat production, 
demonstrated the importance of Sansom’s advice. 
 
 
                                                 
89.  NAZ, S2506/3, Summer Wheat Seed, 1947/8, Letter from H.G. Mundy - P.B. 
Fletcher (Minister of Agriculture and Lands), November 1950.  
90.  NAZ, S2506/3, Summer Wheat Seed, 1947/8, Letter from T.K. Sansom (Acting 
Chief Agriculturist) - Director of Research and Specialist Services, 30 November 
1950. 
91.  NAZ, S2506/3, Summer Wheat Seed, 1947/8, Letter from T.K. Sansom - Director 
of Research and Specialist Services, 30 November 1950. 
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Figure: 3 Wheat production and requirements92  
 
Mundy also believed that what he called a “third world war”, pitting 
capitalist against socialist powers, was imminent. He reasoned that “when 
World War Three comes it can be expected that the difficulty of importing 
our increased and increasing wheat requirements will be greater than ever 
before”.93 He received support from agricultural officials who recommended 
summer wheat in certain parts of the territory. For instance, the Land 
Development Officer at Nyanyadzi, C.D. Humphrey, wrote that he had 
supervised summer wheat production at Nyanyadzi Irrigation Settlement 
since 1949, and that in 1950, there were 90 acres planted which yielded 2 
517 bags, averaging 8.2 bags per acre, with top yields of 12.5 bags per 
acre.94 Humphrey’s testimony was misconstrued to mean that such success 
could be replicated in all the territory’s five agro-ecological zones. 
 
To promote this new ambition, the government persuaded farmers to 
try summer wheat production. Given that these farmers were growing under 
instruction, with no certainty that seed varieties provided were good, the 
FPC guaranteed a minimum return of ₤7.10.0 per acre.95 However, this new 
drive started on a very bad note because the crop fell victim to excessive 
rains and rust in January and February 1951. Nonetheless, the state forged 
ahead with the scheme. Similar attempts in 1952 bore the same results 
hence the state pardoned farmers who had taken summer seed, arguing 
that “since the farmers concerned were persuaded to participate in the 
experiment by the FPC they should not be persecuted for their ready 
cooperation by being required to pay for seed that had not produced any 
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return”.96 The financial costs of such a venture were high because out of a 
total expenditure of ₤903 for the 1951/2 crop, the government received back 
only ₤371,11.97 
 
This shift coincided with the formation of the Federation in 1953 which 
resulted in rapid economic development in the region and was generally 
characterised by prosperity in mining, agriculture and service industries. 
Federal and territorial towns also grew rapidly with Nyasaland providing 
cheap labour to Southern Rhodesia farms and mines while Northern 
Rhodesia contributed its copper earnings, most of which were invested in 
Federal projects which benefited Southern Rhodesia.98 European 
agriculture in Southern Rhodesia was put under the Federal government 
and therefore had access to the greater financial and technological skills 
necessary for making agriculture profitable. In fact, the development of white 
agriculture was the “centrepiece” of the Federal government’s economic 
policy.99 The 1955–56 budget allocated £2 345 281 to agricultural 
development, a figure that was increased annually until the end of the 
Federation in 1963.100 For instance, 63 and 71 percent of the funds 
allocated for agricultural development in the 1956–7 and 1957–8 budget 
respectively was set aside for subsidies.101 Besides funds received in the 
form of direct government subsidies, settler farmers received credit offered 
by state-controlled regional land and agricultural banks. From 1953 to 1959, 
the Southern Rhodesia Land and Agricultural Bank granted £28,8 million to 
white farmers in short and long term loans.102 The impact of this assistance 
to European agriculture can be seen when one notices that its gross value 
rose from £34,2 million to a record £39 million in 1955.103 While it is clear 
that substantial amounts of funds were ploughed into settler agriculture in 
this period, it is important to state that at no time did wheat ever become an 
important Federal export.  
 
Southern Rhodesia utilised Federal financial resources to augment 
her quest for wheat self-sufficiency. The establishment of the Department of 
Research and Specialist Services (DRSS) in 1948 had been a welcome 
move but until the Federal period it had failed to rid the wheat industry of its 
problems because it was preoccupied with research on important cash 
crops such as tobacco and cotton. One of the most important interventions 
by the Federal government towards wheat production in Southern Rhodesia 
was the invitation of a Danish research scientist, O.J.O. Olesen in 1956 to 
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come and carry out wheat research.104 Olesen initiated a wheat breeding 
programme building on the earlier stocks and introduced new varieties from 
other parts of the world. Breeding programmes to develop varieties suitable 
for summer wheat production were extended. Notwithstanding this, no 
suitable summer wheat variety and weed killers had been developed by 
1965. In 1960, the total wheat acreage in the country was 930 acres from 
which 5 300 bags were reaped.105 Still smarting from the costly mistakes of 
the 1950s, Southern Rhodesia returned to winter wheat in 1962. Explaining 
this shift, the Secretary of Agriculture stated: 
 
There can be no considerable increase in wheat production in this country 
except in conjunction with large scale irrigation schemes … until new 
discoveries are made in weed and disease control which make summer 
production under rainfall economically possible, it is considered that the 
policy towards wheat production should be to encourage maximum use in 
suitable rotations of our winter irrigation potential…106  
 
Results were immediate, with the average output rising from 2 to 8.8 
bags per acre and the wheat acreage rising to 1 540 acres.107 Concomitant 
to this was the reduction in the acreage of summer wheat. In 1963, only 630 
acres were under summer wheat with an average output of 2 bags per 
acre.108 From 1964, wheat was mainly grown on a large scale by the Tokwe 
Development Company (Triangle Ltd), on an area covering 1 700 acres, as 
part of a mixed crop rotation with cotton, beans and groundnuts.109 Not 
surprisingly, in 1964 only 1.5 percent of the nation’s wheat consumption was 
locally grown and this was a much lower than the 7 percent in 1928.110 
Furthermore in 1965, the local content of the country’s bread was 4 percent 
which was a far cry from the 20 percent in 1932.111 
 
Political developments arising from the end of the Federation in 1963 
had an important influence on wheat production in the territory. The 
independence of Zambia and Malawi soon after the dissolution of the 
Federation left an important political question in Southern Rhodesia (now re-
named Rhodesia) where settlers were unwilling to accept independence 
based on universal suffrage.112 In 1964, political changes within Rhodesia 
resulted in the removal of Sir Winston Field from power as prime minister 
after his party felt that he had failed to bring an assurance of independence 
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on terms acceptable to them.113 Britain responded to UDI on 11 November 
1965 by severing diplomatic ties and placing sanctions against Rhodesia. 
These included cessation of trade; removal from the sterling area and 
Commonwealth preference system; and denying the country access to 
London’s capital markets.114 She also banned the purchase of Rhodesian 
sugar and tobacco, stopping a net 71 percent by value of Rhodesian 
exports to Britain.115 By December 1965, Britain had extended the ban to all 
minerals and foodstuffs, which made up 95 percent of Rhodesian exports to 
Britain.116 The Rhodesian government reacted to these changes by re-
organising the agricultural sector. This process was characterised by the 
reduction of tobacco production in order to diversify the type of crops 
produced. Simultaneously, the state encouraged large scale production of 
maize, cotton, wheat, soya beans and beef.  
 
Rhodesian farmers took advantage of the similarity in production 
technologies between wheat and other crops to shift to wheat. Much of the 
machinery needed for land preparation, fertiliser and pesticide application, 
and irrigation of wheat was already available, thereby reducing the time 
required to switch to wheat production. The government also created strong 
incentives for commercial farmers to take up wheat production. Producer 
prices for wheat were maintained above import parity prices, and subsidised 
credit programs were introduced.117 Response to these incentives was 
immediate. For instance, just after UDI a new irrigation scheme was started 
by the Sabi Limpopo Authority at Mkwasine (Mkwasine Wheat Scheme) on 
an area covering 2 400 acres.118 This initiative resulted in the rise of the 
average yield per acre for the year 1965 to 12 bags, a significant rise from 
the 8.8 bags in 1962.119 Between 1965 and 1975 rapid growth in wheat 
production transformed the nation from a net wheat importer to a net 
exporter.120 However, local production of wheat in the absence of an export 
market translated into an oversupply in the domestic market and falling 
prices – which ultimately meant lower profit margins for farmers.121 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study dispels the common narrative on settler agriculture that in the 
1920s the local agricultural market was becoming too small to absorb local 
produce; that the production of each crop was faced with overproduction; 
and that during the Second World War there was a change from conditions 
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of surplus production to one of shortages. The attempt by the settler 
government to attain wheat self-sufficiency, although noble, ended in failure. 
With due consideration of the futile efforts made to tip the balance of trade in 
wheat and wheaten products in favour of the settler community, it is safe to 
argue that the history of wheat production reveals that Southern Rhodesia 
had to run twice as fast so as to remain in the same position. 
 
This situation was attributable to a number of reasons. The rising 
population meant an increased demand for wheat and wheaten products, 
but the harsh climatic conditions made the growing of wheat difficult and 
expensive. Financial incapacities meant that the nascent wheat industry 
could not be placed on a sound footing. Furthermore, labour shortages grew 
increasingly acute; wheat farmers could not get sufficient labour at a 
reasonable cost. In turn, these restraints precluded the arrest of the rising 
import bill and the attainment of the national goal of self-sufficiency. 
Eventually, adequate state support for wheat production came with UDI in 
November 1965 which meant that the territory attained what successive 
Southern Rhodesian governments had failed to achieve over a long period. 
Even so, the bubble only lasted for a short period because the oversupply in 
the domestic market and falling prices ultimately meant lower profit margins 
for farmers. 
 
Abstract 
 
Given that temperate conditions are essential for wheat production, 
Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia), located in the tropics, is certainly 
not an ideal wheat producing area. As such, each year reports circulate in 
the Zimbabwean media regarding the numerous challenges faced by wheat 
farmers emphasising immediate action lest the nation fails to get bread, an 
important component of the Zimbabwean diet. However, given the 
importance of wheat and wheaten products, it is amazing that very little is 
known about the history of wheat culture in the country and the historical 
role played by the colonial state towards its development. This study traces 
the historical development of wheat production, arguing that it grew as a 
result of the perpetuation of Western modes of consumption, and that this 
history is characterised by futile attempts to tip the balance of wheat trade in 
favour of the settler community. It concludes that by 1965, climatic 
challenges, labour shortages, population explosion and financial difficulties 
had connived to deny Southern Rhodesia the envisaged goal of self-
sufficiency in wheat and wheaten products.  
 
Keywords: Wheat production; Southern Rhodesia; settler farmers; 
agriculture; wheaten products; labour shortages. 
 
Opsomming 
 
Gegewe die feit dat gematigde klimaatstoestande noodsaaklik is vir die 
produksie van koring, is Zimbabwe (voorheen Suid-Rhodesië), wat in ‘n sub-
tropiese gebied geleë is, nie ideaal daarvoor geskik nie. Derhalwe verskyn 
daar jaarliks berigte in die Zimbabwiese media aangaande die verskeie 
214
Peer-reviewed conference paper – Settler wheat production 
 
214 
 
uitdagings wat graanprodusente in die gesig staar. Die berigte beklemtoon 
gewoonlik die behoefte aan drastiese optrede in gevalle wanneer daar ‘n 
broodgebrek voorkom aangesien brood ‘n belangrike komponent van die 
Zimbabwiese stapeldieët vorm. Desnieteenstaande die belangrikheid van 
koring en koringprodukte, is dit opvallend dat daar min kennis bestaan oor 
die geskiedenis van die koringkultuur in die land en die historiese rol wat die 
koloniale staat gespeel het in die ontwikkeling van hierdie kultuur. Hierdie 
artikel ondersoek die historiese ontwikkeling van koringproduksie in 
Zimbabwe en voer aan dat dit ontwikkel het as volg van die bestendiging 
van westerse verbruikerspatrone. Die geskiedenis van hierdie 
verbruikerspatrone is gekenmerk deur futiele pogings om die skaal van die 
koringhandel in die guns van die wit setlaarsgemeenskap te swaai. Die 
artikel kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat faktore soos klimaatsveranderinge, 
arbeidstekorte, bevolkingsontploffing en finansiële probleme teen 1965 
meegewerk het om Suid-Rhodesië se voorneme van selfversorgendheid ten 
opsigte van graan te verydel. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: Koring; selfversorgendheid; Suid-Rhodesië; setlaarboere; 
landbou; koringprodukte; arbeidstekorte 
